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I. INTRODUCTION
"WE USED TO THINK OUR FATE was in our stars.
Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in our genes."1 So
says James Watson, who co-discovered the double-helix struc-
t J.D., Stanford (1997); D. Phil., Oxford (1993); B. Phil., Oxford (1989); A.B., Colgate
(1987). The author is an associate at the law firm of Goodwin, Procter & Hoar LLP, Exchange
Place, Boston, MA 02109. Ancestors of this Article benefitted from critical commentaries by
Hank Greely, John Lynch, Guy Major, and Frances Miller.
1. James Watson, quoted in Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62, 67.
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ture of DNA2 with Francis Crick in 1953. Crick, for his part,
makes contemporary headlines with his "[aistonishing
[h]ypothesis that 'You,' your joys and your sorrows, your
memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity
and free will, are in fact no more than the [genetically deter-
mined] behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules."3 In a similar vein, the prominent Har-
vard biologist Walter Gilbert asserts that understanding human
genetic structure is "the ultimate answer to the commandment
'Know thyself."' 4 Gilbert is one of the scientific leaders who
fronts the Human Genome Initiative, a fifteen-year federally
funded research project inaugurated in 199. 5 The Human
Genome Initiative aims to produce a complete map of the
DNA structure of all human genes early in the 21st century.
Gilbert likens this ambitious scientific project to a quest for the
"Holy Grail" of human identity. Upon the project's completion,
Gilbert says, each individual will be able to fish from his pock-
et a computer disk containing genetic information and an-
nounce: "Here is a human being; it's me!"6 Proclamations by
scientific leaders like these suggest that the march of genetic
science threatens to transform our idea of personal identity into
an essentially genetic concept. Indeed, a recent book by Doro-
2. The acronym DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, the hereditary molecule that
encodes the genetic blueprints of all living creatures on earth. See J. D. Watson & F. H. S. Crick,
Genetical Implications of the Structure of Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 964, 964 (1953).
3. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE
SOUL 3 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a newspaper account of Crick's recent
work, see Sheryl Stolberg, Chasing the Mysteries of Life: After You Have Helped Crack the Code
for DNA, What's Next?, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1994, at Al.
4. JERRY E. BISHOP & MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, GENOME 218 (1990) (quoting Walter
Gilbert, Professor of Biology at Harvard University).
5. The Human Genome Initiative is funded with public money by the U.S. Congress and
coordinated by the National Institutes of Health and the United States Department of Energy. For
descriptions of the project, see Leslie Roberts, Report Card on the Genome Project, 252 SCIENCE
376 (1991); James D. Watson, A Personal View of the Project, in THE CODE OF CODES:
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 164, 167-70 (Daniel J. Kevles
& Leroy Hood eds., 1992) (hereinafter CODE OF CODES) (describing Watson's views of the
rationale supporting the Human Genome Project and its goals). Concurrent research efforts to map
the human genome are being pursued in other countries. See generally MEDICAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH: A REVIEW OF EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTRIBUTIONS (Diane J. McLaren ed., 1991).
6. Walter Gilbert, A Vision of the Grail in CODE OF CODES 83,96 (describing the difficult
and potentially frightening realization that humans may encounter once realizing that we are
determined by a "finite collection of information").
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thy Nelkin and Susan Lindee documents a tide of media and
literary evidence indicating that DNA is assuming a cultural
meaning similar to that of the Biblical soul. Nelkin and Lindee
conclude that "U]ust as the Christian soul has provided an
archetypal concept through which to understand the person and
continuity of self, so DNA appears in popular culture as a
soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden territo-
ry."7
The idea that DNA determines the essence of personal
identity raises novel legal issues for the protection of an
individual's right to privacy. In privacy terms, genetic informa-
tion is like ordinary medical information about an individual.
Much of the information encoded in a person's DNA mole-
cules has, or will prove to have, medical applications for the
prevention and treatment of diseases. But genetic information
is potentially more sensitive than ordinary medical informa-
tion.' According to scientific leaders like Watson, Crick, and
Gilbert, our genes determine who we are and how we behave.
If we accept this invitation to transform the concept of personal
identity into genetic terms, genetic information should presum-
ably merit special legal protection under the right to privacy -
notwithstanding any of its purely medical applications. Legis-
latures and courts would then be called upon to treat DNA
information with a singular reverence befitting its alleged status
as the repository of an individual's inviolate personality. In
light of widespread popular and scientific opinion, it might
appear foolhardy to argue against the idea that an individual's
DNA blueprint deserves special legal protection as the essential
encoder of his personal identity. Nevertheless, such is the the-
sis I shall defend in this Article.
In brief, I shall argue that advances in genetic science
cannot warrant any transformation of the traditional idea of
personal identity into essentially genetic terms. My account is
premised on the observation that the idea of personal identity
bears internal relations to the concepts of free will and moral
7. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 41 (1995).
8. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between genetic information and
ordinary medical information, see George J. Annas, Privacy Rulesfor DNA Databanks: protecting
Coded 'Future Diaries,' 270 JAMA 2346 (1993).
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responsibility. Genetic science may shed new light upon factors
that causally condition the development of personality through
the power of free choice. But future advances in genetic sci-
ence cannot displace the traditional idea of personal identity
without nullifying our customary concepts of free will and
moral desert. Insofar as we retain some space of action for free
will, our traditional concept of personal identity remains justifi-
ably impervious to encroachment by genetic science. Or so I
shall argue. My thesis will be developed in stages. In Part I of
this Article, I discuss the legal implications of genetic science
and review the arguments for giving DNA information
heightened protection under the right to privacy in particular.
In Part II of the Article, I analyze the concept of personal iden-
tity in light of traditional ideas and philosophical theories of
personhood. In Part III, I evaluate the relation of genetic infor-
mation to the concept of personal identity. I conclude that
DNA structure should not be conflated with the essence of a
person's identity. Instead, the essence of personal identity
inheres in contingent facts about what the individual has cho-
sen to do with his life of his own free will. In the Conclusion,
I shall sketch some legal implications of this view for the pro-
tection of genetic information under the right to privacy. I
conclude that privacy interests in genetic information should be
treated much the same as privacy interests in ordinary medical
information.
H. GENETICS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Legal Implications of the New Genetic Science
In 1953 James Watson and Francis Crick made their fa-
mous discovery of the double-helix structure of deoxyribonu-
cleic acid, or DNA.9 DNA is the molecule that encodes the
hereditary genetic traits of all living creatures on earth." In
the 1970s, additional scientific discoveries about principles of
recombinant DNA analysis1" heralded the advance of sophisti-
9. Id.
10. See Watson & Crick, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Allen M. Maxim & Walter Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 560 (1977) (describing reactions that cleave DNA pref-
[Vol. 8:179
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cated techniques for identifying particular genes and se-
quencing their internal structures. This new technology of
"gene-sequencing" precipitated the massive scientific research
effort of the Human Genome Initiative. When this project is
completed shortly after the turn of the century, scientists will
possess a complete map of all genes in the human genome t2
The human genome consists of a set of twenty-three chromo-
somes found in every nucleated cell of the human body. These
chromosomes are composed of DNA molecules that collec-
tively bear the estimated 100,000 genes that define membership
in the human species. 3 These genes determine all inborn
physical traits of human beings. For example, a person's
height, eye color, sex, race, and susceptibility to certain diseas-
es are all determined by the particular genetic structure exhibit-
ed in his chromosomes. The complete chromosome set in the
human genome is thus the genetic template for humankind.
The rapid progress of current and expected research into
the human genome raises new and disturbing ethical and legal
issues that have yet to be fully confronted by judicial or politi-
cal means. A main aspiration of the Human Genome Initiative
is to permit the eventual identification and eradication of genet-
ically based human diseases. More than 5,000 medical condi-
tions have been traced directly to defective genes. t4 Thus, the
knowledge produced by the Human Genome Initiative promises
unprecedented advances in health care and the treatment and
prevention of disease. At the same time, the knowledge
gleaned from decoding the secrets of the human genome could
pose a significant threat to basic human liberties if used for
improper purposes. One threatened abuse is the use of genetic
information by states or private individuals to promote a Nazi-
style program of positive eugenics - the breeding of a new
erentially, allowing the DNA sequence to be analyzed using radioactive bands); F. Sanger & A.R.
Coulson, A Rapid Method of Determining Sequences in DNA by Primed Synthesis with DNA
Polymerase, 94 J. MOL. BIOLOGY 441 (1975).
12. See sources cited, supra note 5.
13. For the reasoning behind this estimate, see Gilbert, supra note 6, at 83.
14. Genetically based diseases and conditions include phenylketonuria, Gaucher's disease,
cystic fibrosis, Huntington's chorea, Tay-Sach's disease, and sickle-cell anemia. See C. Thomas
Caskey, DNA-Based Medicine: Prevention and Therapy, in CODE OF CODES 112, 116-20 (Daniel




master race. 5 A second kind of threat arises from the possi-
bility that genetic information about individuals may become
widely assembled and deposited in centralized computer data-
bases, much as credit, tax, and insurance information is to-
day.,6 If access to accumulated genetic information is not sub-
ject to proper restrictions, it may cause social stigmas to be
placed upon individuals who have, or are perceived to have,
certain defects or deficiencies in their genetic makeup. A relat-
ed concern is that information about alleged defects in an
individual's genetic blueprint could be used to discriminate
against that individual in employment or insurance contexts. 17
Thus insurance companies might unfairly inflate premiums or
limit coverage for individuals known to have a genetic predis-
position towards Huntington's Disease, or who have increased
susceptibility to cancer. Similarly, an employer might fire, or
refuse to hire, an individual on the basis of genetic information
which allegedly indicates a predisposition to job-related dis-
abilities, or low productivity.
These concerns about the potential abuses of genetic
knowledge present a host of complex ethical and legal issues
that must be resolved by the courts and political policy-makers
in the future. In particular, the courts will be called upon to
15. For discussion, see Diane B. Paul, Is Human Genetics Disguised Eugenics?, in GENES
AND HUMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE 67 (Robert F. Weir et. al. eds., 1994) (discussing how fear of
eugenics has been aroused by information gained through the Human Genome Project); Cf
GEORGE P. SMITH II, GENETCS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 104-06 (1981) (discussing fertilization
technologies and constitutional objections to positive eugenics legislation); PHILIP REILLY,
GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 120 (1977) (discussing the use of genetic screening and
biochemical markers).
16. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 8 (discussing the problems of DNA databanks); Catherine
M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1047
(1993) (stating that genetic profile reports could become as available as credit information). See
generally Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification Testing: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24 U. TOL.
L. REv. 87 (1992) (discussing the possibility that personal information obtained via genetic
testing could be discovered and used for wrongful purposes).
17. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Re-
sponses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) (discussing the possibility that genetic
information could be used against those people with "undesirable conditions"); George P. Smith 11
& Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 23 (1994) (analyzing technology and biological determinism along with constitutional
and legislative protections); Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer
Cost-Cutting, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 369 (1994) (analyzing
genetics issues under the ADA); Henry T. Greely, Health Insurance, Employment Discrimination,
and the Genetics Revolution, in CODE OF CODES 264, 266 (discussing the difficulties of obtaining
health insurance for individuals at high risk for genetic illnesses).
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determine the nature of an individual's legally protected priva-
cy interests in his own genetic information. There are four
traditional strands to an individual's right to privacy. These
concern (i) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude,
(ii) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff, (iii) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye, and (iv) appropriation, for defendant's advan-
tage, of plaintiff's name or likeness."8 The acquisition or use
of DNA information in a given context could conceivably
implicate all of these strands of the right to privacy. There is
little doubt that the courts will establish a legal privilege that
could be labeled an individual's "right to genetic privacy." The
right to genetic privacy will determine the extent to which an
individual may prevent others - for example, health care pro-
viders, employers, or law enforcement officials - from acquir-
ing information about his genetic makeup. It will also deter-
mine the extent to which the individual can block or limit
access to his genetic information, once lawfully assembled, by
third parties."
In the next section, I will briefly review the jurisprudential
history behind the legal right to privacy. Then I shall return
once more to considering the relation between privacy interests
and genetic information.
B. The Right To Privacy
In American jurisprudence, the notion that an individual
has a legally protected privacy interest in his own identity was
first suggested in an 1890 law review article by Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis."0 The authors observed that the mod-
em news enterprise posed novel threats to the traditional com-
mon law right of an individual to determine the extent to
which his personal thoughts and sentiments, whatever the man-
18. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (describing four
classic types of personal invasion).
19. For treatment of the right to genetic privacy in medical contexts, see Annas, supra note
9. For a discussion of privacy issues in health and employment contexts, see Greely, supra note
17, at 266-67. For the use of genetic information in law enforcement contexts, see Burk, supra
note 16.
20. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
1998]
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ner of their expression, shall be communicated to others.21
The development of mechanized printing presses and other
devices of modem mass media threatened "to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet will be pro-
claimed from the housetops."' 22 In response, Warren and
Brandeis postulated a common law "right to privacy" founded
upon the principle of "inviolate personality."' This right to
privacy establishes a protective zone around certain privileged
thoughts, feelings, and actions of an individual from unwanted
publication or expropriation.
Warren and Brandeis also acknowledged that the right to
privacy that protects manifestations of an individual's personal-
ity from unwanted intrusions may coincide with a property
right. Warren and Brandeis asserted that the right to privacy is
potentially independent of, and broader in scope than, property
interests (at least as the latter are ordinarily conceived). For
example, the right to privacy can prevent a newspaper from
publishing details of an individual's vacation itinerary without
his consent, despite the fact that the individual has no legally
protected property interest in such information. Privacy inter-
ests bear at least a formal resemblance to property interests. A
privacy interest in something implies a right to exclude others
from making use of that thing, and the right to exclude is in
turn one of the characteristic legal incidents of property. How-
ever, Warren and Brandeis claimed that "the principle which
protects personal writings and all other personal productions,
not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publi-
cation in any form, is in reality not the principle of private
property, but that of an inviolate personality."' Hence, a per-
son may retain both a property interest in artifacts of his per-
sonality and a (privacy-based) legal privilege to exclusive use
and control over these artifacts that is broader in scope than the
former.
The Supreme Court subsequently recognized a constitu-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 195.





tional basis for this common law right to privacy as an aspect
of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Most famously, the
Supreme Court established a constitutional right to privacy in
matters concerning intimate individual decisions pertaining to
birth control and abortion.26 The Court has explicitly declined
to extend legal protection under the right to privacy to consen-
sual sodomy,27 a taxpayer's interest in preventing disclosure
of his tax records,' and a depositor's interest in preventing
dissemination of his bank records.29 In the next section, I shall
review the nature of arguments presented by legal scholars for
treating genetic information with heightened scrutiny under the
right to privacy.
C. Personal Privacy and Genetic Information
Genetic information about an individual deserves at least
as much protection under the right to privacy as ordinary medi-
cal information. An individual's DNA blueprint contains a vast
amount of information, much of it currently undecipherable,
about the person's biologically determined characteristics.
Today scientists can analyze DNA blueprints to detect genetic
markers that indicate an individual's susceptibility to an in-
creasing number of hereditary diseases, including Down's
Syndrome, phenylketonuria, hemophilia, and cystic fibrosis. 0
As our genetic knowledge increases, DNA blueprints will
prove to have increasingly significant medical implications for
the diagnosis and treatment of diseases.
George Annas has suggested, however, that a DNA blue-
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating that the right to personal privacy
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,499 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding the
use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy).
27. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding constitutional a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy).
28. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that taxpayers' accounting
documents in their attorneys' possession were not constitutionally immune from summons
directing their production).
29. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor had no
Fourth Amendment interest in bank records).
30. See Caskey, supra note 14, at 116-17 (stating that technological improvements in




print is potentially more sensitive than ordinary medical infor-
mation about an individual.31 Annas analogizes a DNA blue-
print to a probabilistic "future diary" of an individual's project-
ed life history.32 As genetic science advances, the DNA blue-
print may well be used to make increasingly accurate statistical
predictions about the odds that a given event will befall a
person at some point in his future. Scientists may well develop
the capacity to scan an individual's DNA blueprint and predict
the odds that the individual will, for example, commit arson,
develop a gambling problem, or become a world-class mathe-
matician. Hence, one might argue that the probabilistic "future
diary" contained in a DNA blueprint is at least as intimate a
manifestation of an individual's inviolate personality as his
written diary.
At the same time, the case for giving DNA information
heightened protection under the right to privacy is not neces-
sarily limited to its conjectured predictive power concerning an
individual's future life history. State and federal circuit courts
have extended the privacy right to encompass a variety of
infringements against the particular manifestations of a
person's identity besides the paradigm cases of unwarranted
intrusions into his diary, personal records, or private behavior.
Such infringements include expropriation of a person's
name,33  photograph, or likeness;' his signature;35  and his
31. Annas, supra note 8, at 2347-48.
32. Id.
33. See Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. 1907) (stating that "[i]t sufficiently appears
that the complainant's property rights now existing... are seriously menaced by the unlawful and
unwarranted use of the complainant's name as the father of the child in the recorded birth certifi-
cate"); Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 542-44 (1891) (finding that a drug
manufacturer had the right to use its name even though other manufacturer also used that name
because the name was used in good faith and there was no evidence of fraud or intent to deceive
the public).
34. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that California courts would afford legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest
in his own identity); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(holding that the right to exploit "name and likeness" is personal and must be exercised during the
artist's lifetime); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (concluding that
one has exclusive property right in his picture, and unless he has expressly or implicitly consented
to its use by others, he may sue for invasion of that right); Canessa v. J.1. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d
62, 76 (N.J. Super. 1967) (holding that a company which used plaintiffs likeness for its own
commercial benefit violated plaintiffs "property" rights).
35. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) (stating that the "use of an individual's signature for business purposes unquestionably
[Vol. 8:179
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voice or even a likeness of his voice.36 Hence it may appear
that information about an individual's DNA blueprint deserves
special protection under the right to privacy, notwithstanding
its conjectured predictive strength. For example, as Catherine
Valerio Barrad states:
[An] individual's genetic profile is even more innately an attrib-
ute of his identity than is his likeness or his voice, since the
latter are merely physical expressions of genetic information. If
one's face, physical features, and voice are so intrinsic to the
individual as to be protected as inviolate personality, then the
genetic determinate of those attributes must be the true expres-
sion of the person's identity and also protected against appropri-
ation.37
The idea that genetic information constitutes the sacred
ground of personal identity is not, of course, merely the effect
of creative extrapolation by legal scholars from state and feder-
al case law. As we saw in the Introduction, this idea is promot-
ed independently by dramatic pronouncements from such pil-
lars of the scientific community as Watson, Crick, and Gilbert.
(Recall here Gilbert's declaration that understanding genetic
structure is "the ultimate answer to the commandment 'Know
thyself")., The putative sanctity of genetic information is
also promulgated in American culture at large by a host of
news articles, television shows, movies, and works of popular
and literary fiction.39 As far as popular American culture is
concerned, DNA blueprints are widely conceived as "the 'ulti-
mate identifier,' an utterly conclusive code establishing the
essence as well as the identity of the person. '
However, the mere fact that DNA appears to be acquiring
a cultural significance similar to that of the Biblical soul does
constitutes the exercise of a valuable right of property in the.broadest sense of that term").
36. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that a person's
voice, or an impersonation of his or her voice, is .the. individual's property, and to use an
impersonation without authorization is a tort under California law), aff'd sub nomt. Midler v.
Young & Rubicam, Inc., Nos. 90-55027 & 90-55028, 944 F.2d 909, 1991 WL 185170 (9th Cir.
1991) (affirming prior ruling that advertising agency inappropriately sought to imitate pro-
fessional singer's voice, which was an attribute of the singer's identity), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
951 (1992).
37. Barrad, supra note 16, at 1070.
38. BISHOP & WALDHOLZ, supra note 4.
39. For an extensive review of this material, see NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 7.
40. Id. at 47.
1998]
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not of itself justify such a prospective dignification. Let us
assume, arguendo, that if an individual's DNA blueprint en-
codes the essence of his personal identity, then it does deserve
special legal protection under the right to privacy. What re-
mains to be seen is whether we have good grounds for accept-
ing the antecedent of this conditional: Does DNA structure
really encode the essence of a person's identity? To evaluate
this claim, we must first conduct an independent investigation
into our concept of personhood. Such will be the task of Part II
of this Article. In Part III, I shall use the results of this inves-
tigation to show why DNA should not be conflated with the
essence of an individual's personal identity.
IH. THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON
A. Theories of Personal Identity
The idea of personal identity has long exercised the imagi-
nations of philosophers and psychologists. The American legal
system, however, has never established any precise definition
of this concept." The Fourteenth Amendment extends legal
protection to all persons born or naturalized within the United
States. But the Constitution does not contain any definition of
this term. The Supreme Court does make reference to the defi-
nition of "person" in three cases. But two of these three cases
merely establish the proposition that children are persons with-
in the meaning of the Constitution.42 The third case states, in
41. On the absence of any substantive theory of personal identity in constitutional law, see
Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of
Constitutional Personhoodfor Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445-66
(1992), which attempts to formulate a new concept of personhood for American jurisprudence.
Constitutional law does define a distinction between "natural" persons and "artificial" persons,
where the former category applies to humans and the latter to legally created business entities
such as corporations. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199-205
(recognizing that, while "the wor[d] 'person' includes corporations,... " There remains a
distinction between "artificial persons" and "natural persons"). Even though the law has given a
more or less precise definition of "artificial" persons, it has effectively treated the concept of a
natural person as an undefined primitive.
42. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding a juvenile has the right to notice of charges, to
counsel, to confrontation, to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-
incrimination); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (stating that illegitimate children are
"clearly persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and holding that denying them the right to
recover for the wrongful death of their mothers would be "invidious discrimination").
[Vol. 8:179
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apparent dicta, that a fetus is not a person for constitutional
purposes.43 Of course, the current lack of any well-developed
judicial theory of personhood is not surprising. In practice, the
law can, for the most part, operate quite effectively without
any precise definition of "person." Most litigated issues involve
adult human beings, creatures to whom the application of the
term is uncontroversial. However, to gain a proper understand-
ing of the relation between genetic information and personal
identity, we must directly confront the question of what it is
that makes persons the kinds of things they are.'
Theories of personal identity have been propounded since
the dawn of philosophy.' For our purposes, we can usefully
categorize the distinctive features of these theories by reference
to the views of Aristotle, Descartes, and David Hume. A
broadly Aristotelian view of personal identity derives its inspi-
ration from Aristotle's ancient definition of man as a rational
animal.' Accordingly, the concept of a person is the concept
of a single biological entity, a living material organism, which
has a distinctive functional or behavioral capacity.47 This dis-
tinctive capacity is the ability to reason: to have thoughts, draw
logical inferences, enjoy self-reflective awareness, and deliber-
ate rationally about what to do.4" By comparison, a Cartesian
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (stating that "the word 'person,' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
44. Many scholars have written on legal issues involving the topic of personal identity. See,
e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 313, 316 (1992) (stating that genetic essentialism will force lawmakers to reconsider legal
rules that currently mediate relationships between persons and their community); Rivard, supra
note 41 (examining the question of what should constitute personhood in American
jurisprudence); Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person: Toward the Common
Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the Premise of A Future
Community and the Role of the Self Therein, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 789 (1991) (discussing the role
and conception of "person" in modem legal theory); Amy Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, and
Privacy in Texas, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1521, 1530-31 (1990) (stating that Texas common law does not
recognize a fetus as a person); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982) (discussing the relationship between personhood and control over resources in one's
external environment).
45. For a useful sampling of theories offered by both ancient and modem philosophers, see
PERSONAL IDENTrY (John Perry ed., 1975) (compiling essays by fifteen philosophers on topics
related to personal identity, personality, and self).
46. ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA, 412b10-25, 414bl-9 (R.D. Hicks trans., 1907). For an analysis
of Aristotle's view of the person, see T.H. Irwin, The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of
Aristotle's Ethics, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S EThIcs (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
47. For further discussion on the concept of a person, see DAvID WIGGINS, SAMENESS AND
SuBSTANCE 149-89 (1980).
48. For an elucidation of this rationality criterion, see Donald Davidson, Rational Animals,
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view of the self draws inspiration from Descartes' famous pro-
nouncement: cogito, ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am").4 9
The Cartesian view pins the essence of personal identity
on the capacity to reason alone. It conceives the person as an
immaterial thinking substance, or soul. Persons are purely
mental entities that can exist independently of their material
bodies." The Humean view, in turn, goes one step further by
simply dispensing with the idea that the self is any distinctive
kind of entity at all. This most radical view is inspired by
David Hume's notorious complaint that nothing in his own felt
experience actually corresponds to the perception of a unitary
thinking subject over time." As such, the Humean view de-
nies that the pronoun "I" refers to any kind of entity, be it a
material body or an immaterial thinking soul, whatsoever. On
this "no-self' view of the self, the term T denotes a fictitious
entity which reduces upon analysis to nothing but a series of
temporally related sensations, thoughts, and emotions." How-
ever, we need not embark upon any detailed evaluation of
in ACTIONS AND EVENTS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 473-80
(Ernest Lepore & Brian McLaughlin eds., 1985) (arguing that the attribution of reasoning ability
presupposes a capacity for linguistic communication).
49. For the classic statement of Descartes' theory of the self as a thinking substance, see
Meditations on First Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 131, 151-53
(Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., Cambridge University Press 1967). For modem
discussion and critique of the Cartesian view of self, see generally PAUL M. CHURCHLAND,
MATITER AND CONSCIOUSNESS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
7-21 (1984) (discussing the various dualist approaches to the mind); MARGARET DAULER WIL-
SON, DESCARTES (1978); BERNARD WILLIAMS, DESCARTES: THE PROJECr OF PURE ENQUIRY
(1978).
50. Id. Prominent proponents of a Cartesian-esque concept of person in the history of
philosophy include John Lock and Immanuel Kant. Outside theological circles, the Cartesian view
of the self has few, if any, defenders in modem times. See also Richard Warner, In Defense of
Dualism, in THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A GUIDE TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 343 (Richard
Warner & Tadeusz Szubka eds., 1994) (defending the traditional doctrine of "incorrigibility"
recognizes a fundamental epistemological difference between the mental and the physical).
51. Hume states:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble
upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred,
pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can
observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time,
as by sound sleep, so long as I am insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to
exist.
PERSONAL IDENTrrY, 162 (John Perry ed. 1975) (quoting DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, Book. I, Part. IV, § 2 (1739)).
52. A modem example of the "no-self' Humean view is presented in DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS, Part I1 (1984).
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these competing theories of self as presented by their ablest
philosophical defenders. Law in its practical respects is a justly
conservative intellectual enterprise. Hence we may properly
dismiss those approaches to personal identity that least accord
with our common sense and scientific pictures of the world.
The Cartesian theory of a person as a non-material think-
ing substance has traditionally foundered over two related
objections. First, it postulates a mysterious non-physical sub-
stance that scientists have yet to quantify, or even feel any
need to invoke, in their best theories for explaining and pre-
dicting the course of our worldly experience. Second, the very
idea of a non-physical thinking substance appears to preclude
any intelligible possibility of causal interactions between mind
and the physical world. Our concept of a causal relation is
preeminently that of a relation that holds between physically
definable entities or magnitudes. In short, we think that only a
physical entity can causally affect another physical entity, and
that a physical entity can be causally affected only by another
physical entity. By contrast, the Cartesian view of the person
introduces a seemingly insoluble mystery as to how there can
be "two-way" causal transactions between the non-physical
minds and physical objects. How can a non-physical thinking
entity cause events in the physical world like the movement of
an arm or a leg? How can physical events, e.g. retinal irradia-
tion or the impact of hammer on thumb, produce thoughts and
feelings in a non-physical thinking substance? Given the gravi-
ty of these difficulties, we may properly reject the Cartesian
conception of personhood as incompatible with our scientific
conception of the physical world. 3
Similarly, the Humean "no-self' theory can be dismissed
as a candidate for articulating a legally serviceable concept of
personal identity on both scientific and common sense
grounds.5 4 First, the Humean theory faces an analogous prob-
53. Extended historical and philosophical critiques of the Cartesian view of self may be
found in ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND 1-31 (1989); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOS-
OPHY AND THE MIRROR OF HuMAN NATURE, 17-61 (1979).
54. For a philosophical critique of the Humean view of self, see, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 1-19 (1981) [hereinafter MORAL LUCK]
(comparing Kantian and Unitarian components of self); see also WIGGINS, supra note 47, at 169-
76 (distinguishing between the concept of "persons" expressed by John Locke and Descartes, and
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lem about accounting for two-way causal transactions between
the mind and the physical world. For Hume, there is no unitary
thinking self that enters into causal transactions with the world,
there is only a temporally connected "stream" of sense-impres-
sions.5 Thus, while the Cartesian view has grave difficulty
accounting for the possibility of causal interactions between
mind and physical objects, the Humean view runs into equally
serious trouble in its denial that such interactions take place at
all. Second, from a common sense perspective, the Humean
"no-self' theory moots the whole question of legally protected
aspects of personhood. If there really are not such things as
persons in reality (qua unitary subjects of sense-expressions),
then there are no legally protected incidents of personal iden-
tity.
By comparison, the Aristotelian conception of personhood
is not beset by any of the difficulties described above, and best
fits our common sense and scientific world views.56 Persons
are physical (biological) entities with distinctively rational
capacities, or modes of functioning. They are material bodies
that can do certain distinctive things, in contrast with other
material bodies like rocks and chairs that cannot. Of course
there are lingering puzzles about how physical entities can
have thoughts, feelings, and so on. But the Aristotelian as-
sumption that persons are physical entities avoids the otherwise
insoluble Cartesian problem about the nature of causal interac-
tion between mind and world. It also supplies us with an entity
that has practically meaningful criteria of identity upon which a
substantive theory of legal personality can be built.
the concept held by Hume, among others).
55. As a matter of fact, Hume's notorious skeptical theory of causal relations also led him
to deny the existence of any external world of unitary physical objects - let alone a world
containing unitary thinking selves. See generally J.L. MAcKEE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A
STUDY OF CAUSATION (1974). In the final analysis, the Humean world consists solely of a
temporally connected stream of sense-impressions. But Hume's distinctive view of the self can, of
course, be detached from and considered independently of his skepticism regarding the existence
of physical objects.
56. Prominent contemporary philosophers who have argued for a broadly Aristotelian view
of the self include ANTHONY KENNY, supra note 53; WIGGINS, supra note 47, at 149-89
(discussing the author's concepts of personal identity). For comprehensive, technical presentations
of modern philosophical and scientific accounts of the relationship between self, mind, and body,
see COLIN McGINN, THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, ESSAYS TOWARD A RESOLUTION (1991);
JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF MIND (1994).
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B. Two Basic Components of Personhood
If we start with a broadly Aristotelian concept of the per-
son, how then are we to understand the connection between its
biological and functional components? First, we might restrict
the biological component of personhood to the human species,
as Aristotle evidently did. But intuitively, there seems no sound
reason for such "species chauvinism." Other kinds of living
creatures - for example, dolphins and chimpanzees - might
conceivably evolve the capacity to satisfy the functional com-
ponent of personhood. If dolphins developed a proven capacity
to reason like normal human beings, it is hard to see why we
should withhold application of the term "person" to them.
Dolphins already enjoy limited protection from tuna fisherman
under the law. If dolphins were to demonstrate a capacity to
conform their behavior to moral and legal strictures - e.g., to
make and keep promises with human beings in the scope of
social and economic endeavors - there seems no intuitive
objection to extending them full-scale legal protection as per-
sons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, if alien life
forms from another solar system were to land on earth and
likewise demonstrate a capacity to communicate, reason, and
behave morally, at least as well as normal human beings, we
should have little scruple against regarding them as persons.
Consequently, it seems best not to restrict the biological com-
ponent of personhood to the human species alone. Human
beings are of course the only kind of creature of which we are
aware that deserves to be counted as persons. But in theory,
any kind of living organism which can satisfy the functional
component of personhood should be also considered a per-
son.
57
Next, let us focus on the functional component. Should
something be considered a person if it has the capacity to
reason just like normal human beings, but is not a creature
belonging to any biological kind? Since the dawn of the com-
puter age, scientists, science fiction writers, and laymen have
57. For a philosophical discussion of the "species-independent" nature of personhood, see
WIGGINS, supra note 47, at 169-76 (discussing the nature and limits of personhood with respect to
humans, plants, and animals).
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fantasized about the possibility of a computer that could be
programmed to think and reason at least as well as normal hu-
mans do, and perhaps even better. We already have computers
that can be programmed to "reason" both faster and just as
accurately as human beings can in regard to certain restricted
types of problems, such as doing arithmetical sums or working
out chess problems. Indeed, the IBM chess machine, "Deep
Blue," made recent headlines by becoming the first computer
to defeat the reigning world champion Garry Kasparov in a
game played under tournament conditions." Moreover, in the
next twenty to fifty years, we will most probably be able to
program computers that can effectively simulate all the verbal
reasoning behavior of, say, an average thinking human being
with a college education. When this day comes, an individual
could go on-line in an Internet "chat-room" containing five
human beings and a computer, and be completely unable to
distinguish which "person" is the computer, judging solely by
the electronically transmitted conversation. A computer that has
the ability to simulate normal human conversational behavior
without detection is said to pass the celebrated "Turing Test"
for an artificially intelligent system.59 Should we extend the
concept of person to include computers or any form of man-
made machine that can pass the Turing Test? Such devices
would, by definition, satisfy the functional reasoning compo-
nent of personhood. But they would not, of course, belong to
any kind of biological category.
Let us set aside any awkward issues that might arise if,
58. Deep Blue shocked the chess community by winning the opening match in the 1996
ACM Chess Challenge tournament with Kasparov. But Kasparov later rebounded to defeat the
computer soundly by the final game score of the competition. See Jack Peters, Deep Blue is Deep-
Sixed by Kasparov, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at A21 ("In the first game of the match, Deep
Blue became the only program to defeat a world champion under standard tournament
conditions"). For a discussion of the implications of this event for the development of artificial
intelligence, see Robert Wright, Can Machines Think?, TIME, Mar. 25, 1996, at 50 (explaining
recent advances in artificial intelligence, future possibilities, and pertinent philosophical
questions).
59. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950) (proposing
the creation of an "imitation game" in which one of the participants is a computer which has the
capability of learning, thinking, and imitating human conversational behavior; others are human,
and an "interrogator" determines which participant is the computer based on the unidentified an-
swers to his or her questions to the participants). For an accessible elucidation of the "Turing
Test" for artificial intelligence, see RoGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND 6-13 (1989).
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fifteen years from now, we were legally obliged to grant two
week's vacation time to, for instance, the massively parallel
900 gigahertz "Wintel" computers on our desktops. Computers
are made of silicon chips, not flesh, blood, and DNA. Being
made of such different kinds of stuff, we think intuitively that
computers could not have the conscious thoughts, feelings, and
emotions that living human beings do.' This is true despite
the fact that computers can certainly be programmed to "talk"
as if they do have such thoughts and feelings. The application
of our concept of a person is intuitively restricted to living
organisms that satisfy the functional component of reasoning
ability. No entity can count as a person merely because its
behavior can simulate that of a normal reasoning human being.
It must also be a living creature that belongs to some biologi-
cal category or other. Of course, this does not preclude the
possibility that future scientists may manufacture some form of
organic reasoning device that satisfies the two conditions for
personhood. But by definition, an organic reasoning device
would be an instance of artificially manufactured life, not sim-
ply non-living artificial intelligences like our everyday
Pentiums and Macs.
C. The Fundamental Criterion of Personal Identity
So far, we have analyzed the general concept of a person,
but we have yet to tackle the nature of personal or self-iden-
tity. What is it that makes one person the same or different
from another? A quick answer is that persons A and B are the
same if they have exactly the same set of properties, and con-
versely, that A and B are different persons if there is at least
some property true of one but not the other. This answer is
entirely correct. But it is uninformative insofar as it follows
purely from the formal logic of identity known as Leibniz's
Law.6 For our purposes, we seek bigger game. Given that a
person is an organism of some biological kind with a distinc-
60. For an elaboration of this intuition, see JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND
65-82 (1992) (discussing the idea that the relationship between consciousness, behavior, and the
brain supports the notion that the world is not completely objective).
61. For a discussion of Leibniz's Law and its logical and philosophical implications for the
concept of identity, see WIGGINS, supra note 47, at 15-46.
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tive threshold capacity to reason, we may infer that identity
and difference of persons is parasitic on identity and difference
of organisms within biological kinds.6' But what makes one
organism of a given biological kind the same or different from
another? Here the concept of a DNA blueprint has an obvious
role to play. If two organisms of the same species have dif-
ferent DNA blueprints, then it follows from the logic of identi-
ty that the difference in genetic properties entails that these
organisms must be different persons (if indeed they are per-
sons). But what if organisms A and B have the same DNA
blueprints? Can we infer that A and B are one and the same
organism, hence the same person?
Here the answer must be an emphatic no. Two or more
organisms can share the same DNA blueprint without being
identical. The biological property of having a certain DNA
structure is typically unique to each member of any complex
species of animal. These biological properties may, nonethe-
less, be shared by other members of that species. Identical
human twins can share the same DNA blueprint. But, of
course, they count as two different persons. In addition, two or
more different pairs of parents could, in theory, produce chil-
dren that, courtesy of some truly amazing rolls of the genetic
dice, end up sharing the same DNA blueprint. Regardless of
how astronomically unlikely such an event would be, these
combination principles of genetic science render it a theoretical
possibility.
Moreover, genetic scientists have long been capable of
engineering or "cloning" from a DNA blueprint genetically
identical copies of simple organisms like bacteria, not to men-
tion individual human cells (including embryo cells).63 And as
startling newspaper accounts in 1997 have recounted, Scottish
scientists Keith Campbell and Ian Wilmut recently succeeded
in cloning a genetically identical sheep from the DNA
62. Of course, given the possibility that more than one biological kind (e.g., humans and
dolphins) could possess the appropriate reasoning capacity, identity, and difference of persons
may also supervene upon identity and difference of organisms both within and across biological
kinds.
63. See Kathy Sawyer, Researchers Clone Human Embryo Cells, WASH. POST., Oct. 25,
1993, at A4 (discussing how George Washington University researchers cloned cells from
abnormal human embryos which survived up to the equivalent of six days of maturation).
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blueprint of another animal.6' This new cloning breakthrough
gives today's genetic scientists the basic technological expertise
to clone higher mammals - including human beings - from a
single DNA blueprint.65 Apparently, genetic scientists actually
possess, or will very soon possess, the capacity to create a
genetic duplicate of every person on the face of the earth.
Consequently, while a difference in DNA blueprints entails
difference of persons, sameness of the DNA blueprint cannot
logically guarantee sameness of person. DNA structure is,
therefore, not to be confused with the Holy Grail of personal
identity. DNA structure is at best a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for personal identity. Two further questions
arise. First, if DNA does not determine sameness of personal
identity, what else does? Second, how should we understand
the relation between DNA and personal identity? I shall con-
sider each in turn.
At this point, the condition which determines sameness of
person may begin to look rather mysterious. Indeed, it will
exude this air of mystery so long as we seek some immutable
factor that determines the essence of each individual person's
identity. The key to the nature of personal identity is to be
found in rather more humble contingent facts that make up
each person's unique life history. Each human being travels
upon a logically contingent but empirically unique path through
64. See Rick Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep: Technique's Use With Humans
Is Feared, WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al (reporting that Scottish scientists Ian Wilmut and
Keith Campbell successfully cloned an adult sheep, and discussing the ethical considerations of
applying the technology to humans); Ronald Kotulak, First Mammal is Cloned: Breakthrough
Could Make it Possible to Duplicate Humans, CH. TRtB., Feb. 23, 1997, at I (outlining the steps
used in the cloning technique and discussing the possible agricultural opportunities cloning could
create).
65. Kotulak, supra note 64 (explaining how scientists reactivated shut off genes through
fusion during sheep cloning). This new cloning technology has not yet been used successfully to
create genetically identical human beings. Moreover, there remain significant questions about
whether it would be morally and or socially desirable to do so. But in any event, it is now not
seriously disputable that genetic science permits the technical possibility of cloning of a series of
genetically identical human beings from the DNA blueprint found in any single nucleated human
cell. Politicians, lawyers, and laymen have yet to confront fully the moral and social implications
of this technological possibility. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw the
Line?, TwME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 65-70 (discussing situations in which cloning may occur, and the
ethical considerations involved); George A. Hudock, Gene Therapy and Genetic Engineering:
Frankenstein is Still a Myth But It Should Be Reread Periodically, 48 IND. L. J. 533, 548-50
(1973) (noting that regulation has not caught up with current levels of genetic engineering
technology and proposing that doing so is "possible and will not be overwhelmingly confusing").
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space and time during the course of his life history. So same-
ness of biological kind and sameness of spatiotemporal posi-
tion, or route, determines - that is, is both necessary and
sufficient for - sameness of personal identity.'
Sameness of both biological kind and spatiotemporal posi-
tion is a sufficient condition for personal identity because only
one person can be in exactly the same place at the same time.
If we know that the President of the United States is the man
speaking from that podium now, and that Hillary Clinton's
husband is speaking from the podium now, then we may infer
that Hillary's husband and the President of the United States
are one and the same person. Similarly, if we have evidence
proving that the young man who installed astro-turf in his
pickup truck some thirty odd years ago has traveled upon a
continuous spatiotemporal route to the position of the man now
speaking from the podium, we may correctly deduce that they
are one and the same person. Sameness of biological kind and
spatiotemporal position is also a necessary condition for per-
sonal identity. If we can establish difference of biological kind,
or more commonly, difference of spatiotemporal position, we
can correctly deduce a difference of person.
Appeal to this feature of personal identity is commonly
employed in the context of criminal prosecutions. Thus for
example, the accused may be exonerated by an alibi establish-
ing his presence in Los Angeles on the night of the Miami
murder. Alternatively, the logic of personal identity may ex-
onerate if DNA evidence shows the crime must have been
committed by a woman and the accused is a man. Such famil-
iar and elementary patterns of reasoning show that the Holy
Grail of personal identity is, at bedrock, just sameness of bio-
logical kind and spatiotemporal position. At any rate, this is the
basic criterion of personal identity implicit in our common
sense, legal, and scientific world views.67
66. For a comprehensive, if technical, discussion of this principle and the theory behind it,
see WIGGINS, supra note 47, at 47-74, 149-89 (proposing and discussing a theory of
individuation).
67. Of course, science fiction writers have fantasized about the possibility of one person's
being in two different places at the same time, or of two or more persons, or "souls," that share the
same body. Such imaginings are at odds with the broadly Aristotelian concept of a person implicit
in our common sense and scientific theories of the world. We need not take them seriously in any
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D. Personal Identity and Character
So let us proceed on the premise that sameness of biologi-
cal kind and spatiotemporal position is the fundamental criteri-
on of personal identity. At the same time, what most interests
us about the concept of personal identity are not bare facts
about sameness of biological kind and spatiotemporal route.
We think that the most important facts that make a human be-
ing the person he is are facts about what he does - facts
about his thoughts, feelings, choices, and actions - as he
passes through space and time. The unvarnished facts about the
unique spatiotemporal path he traverses may form the meta-
physical substrate of his personal identity. From a psychologi-
cal, social, and moral perspective, however, the facts that are
most important in making a human being the very person he is
are facts about what he chooses to do with his life. As the
existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre articulated this idea,
the "existence" of a person precedes his "essence," and the
latter is created by the free choices he faces and makes during
the course of his life history.68 Another way of expressing the
same idea is that the identity of a person is determined by the
character he develops.69 Roughly speaking, a person's charac-
ter is the set of mental properties and dispositions that distin-
guishes him as a unique individual from all other persons.
Later on, we shall see that this preliminary definition requires
considerable qualification and sharpening."
For the present, we may begin with the idea that a
person's character is defined by all the properties of his past
and present mental history. It includes all the particular
thoughts, feelings, deliberations, and choices that constitute his
mental history up to the present. And it also includes whatever
properties of a person that make it true to say that he has cer-
attempt to elucidate a legally serviceable concept of personal identity.
68. See Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM: FROM DOSTOEVSKY
TO SARTRE 287-94 (Walter Kaufman ed., 1956).
69. For a discussion of the importance of character to our concepts of personal identity and
morality, see, e.g., WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supra note 54 (arguing that the person undergoes
changes in character and remains unitary, not a disjointed collection of moral beliefs).
70. In section IlD, I conclude that this provisional definition of character should be




tain dispositions to think, feel, deliberate, or choose in certain
ways in the future.71
What then, is the connection between a person's character
and the fundamental criterion of personal identity? Here it is
important to understand that, properly interpreted, the idea that
character determines personal identity does not conflict with
the principle that sameness of person is determined by same-
ness of biological kind and spatiotemporal route. Of course,
two different persons can develop remarkably similar charac-
ters. But according to the provisional definition of "character"
above, no two individuals can have exactly the same character.
It is very unlikely, but not necessarily impossible, for two
different persons to share the same dispositional properties of
character. Two or more people could share their set of charac-
teristic propensities to think, feel, deliberate, or choose in cer-
tain ways in the future. But it is logically impossible for two
different persons to share the very same non-dispositional
properties of character.72 These non-dispositional properties of
a person's character record the particular thoughts, feelings,
and choices that make up each person's unique mental life
history. Each person is logically guaranteed to have a singular
mental history in the sense intended because his particular
thoughts, feelings, and choices are artifacts of the unique path
through space and time that constitutes his own life situation.
71. Presumably, facts about how a person has thought, deliberated, or chosen in the past
play a substantial role in determining the dispositional facts about how he is likely to think,
deliberate, or choose in the future. For a philosophical discussionof this issue in the context of the
Aristotelian conception of the person, see M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Learning to be Good, in
ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 69 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). See infra note 73 for
the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties of objects.
72. Philosophers customarily draw a distinction between dispositional and non-
dispositional properties of objects, and commonly label the latter as "categorical" in nature.
Roughly speaking, dispositional properties of objects are expressed by statements that take a
subjunctive conditional form, e.g., "if Smith became a lawyer, he would have been financially
successful," or "if Smith chooses to be a lawyer after graduation, he will become financially
successful." By contrast, categorical properties of objects are expressed by any assertion not of the
subjunctive conditional form, e.g., "Smith is a lawyer," "Smith was a lawyer." Dispositional
properties of objects are commonly conceived to be functions of their categorical properties. For
example, Smith's disposition to become financially successful in the future may be determined by
the categorical property that he is a law school graduate. This distinction between categorical and
dispositional properties need not further concern us here. For a somewhat technical discussion of
this topic in the context of modern philosophy of language, the interested reader may consult
Michael Dummett, What is a Theory of Meaning? (II), in TRUTH AND MEANING 67-137 (Gareth
Evans & John McDowell eds., 1976).
202 [Vol. 8:179
DNA BLUEPRINTS
Hence the idea that character determines personal identity does
not contradict but logically coincides with the idea that same-
ness of person is determined by sameness of biological kind
and spatiotemporal route. If A and B have exactly the same
character (understood to include both mental dispositions to
future behavior and past mental history), they must be of the
same biological kind and have traversed the same
spatiotemporal route (and vice-versa).
Of course, if we need to deploy a definitive operational
criterion for determining whether two persons are the same in
cases of uncertainty, we generally use the criterion of
spatiotemporal position/route. Consider, for example, the
condundrum of personal identity presented in the French film
Le Retour de Martin Guerre (The Return of Martin Guerre).73
The film is based on the true story of a certain 16th century
roguish young peasant from the small village of Artigat in the
foothills of the Pyrenees in southwestern France.74 Guerre
(played by Gerard Depardieu) disappears shortly after his mar-
riage while serving in the military.75 Eight years later, a man
appears in the village.76 He claims to be the absent husband,
and takes up with the long-forsaken wife.77 A predictable
brouhaha ensues, and Depardieu endeavors to prove his "iden-
tity" in part by displaying personal characteristics identical to
those of the departed man.78 The ploy is unmasked in the de-
nouement, where the real Martin Guerre, now a grizzled veter-
an, strides from the gallery to denounce the imposter before the
Parlement of Toulouse.79 For our purposes, the story's moral
is that sameness of spatiotemporal position, not sameness of
character, is the epistemically superior criterion for personal
identity. But in practice, we may justly rely on the
epistemically subordinate character criterion in contexts where
we lack any evidence concerning the former.
73. LE RETOUR DE MARTIN GuERRE (Societe Francaise de Production Cinematographique
1982).
74. See NATALiE ZEMON DAvIS, THE RETURN OF MARTiN GuERRE 6-18 (1983) (providing
an historical analysis of the story of Martin Guerre).







IV. GENETIC STRUCTURE AND PERSONAL
IDENTITY
A. Genes and Character
If the psychologically and socially interesting criterion of
personal identity is sameness of character, we may naturally
inquire whether DNA structure has some fundamental role to
play in shaping it. A person's DNA structure determines a
virtually indefinite number of physical traits possessed by an
individual, from height, eye color, sex, and race, down to the
shapes of a person's toes."0 We also have some reason to sup-
pose that many of a person's mental traits and dispositions
have a genetic foundation. Scientists have in fact isolated cer-
tain genes that indicate an increased susceptibility to certain
diseases, for example, Down's Syndrome and Huntington's
Disease.8" Moreover, there is some evidence, albeit far from
conclusive, that a person's IQ, emotional temperament, and
certain other mental qualities have causal antecedents in his
genetic structure. 2 To what extent, then, might a person's
character be determined by the features of his DNA blueprint?
A priori there are three possible answers here. First, all proper-
ties of a person's character might be causally pre-determined
by his DNA structure. Label this the thesis of "Strong Genetic
Determinism." The second thesis, which may be called "Semi-
Strong Genetic Determinism," is that some properties of a
person's character are causally pre-determined by his DNA
structure, but other properties are not.83 Third, DNA structure
80. Of course not all physical traits are determined by a person's DNA blueprint. An
equally indefinite number of physical traits may be acquired as a result of external events,
accidents, or intentional behavior. Macroscopic bodily parts and functions may be altered or
removed through diet, exercise, injury, medical treatment, tattoos, and so on. Even a person's
DNA blueprint itself may be mutated as a result of exposure to radiation or to chemical car-
cinogens. However, there must be outer limits to the degrees of genetic change that a person may
undergo before ceasing to belong to a given biological kind.
81. See Caskey, supra note 14, at 116-19 (stating that scientists now have the ability to test
for myriad other diseases using DNA-based methods).
82. See generally Daniel Koshland, Jr., Nature, Nurture and Behavior, 235 SCIENCE 1445
(1987) (summarizing and discussing the ramifications of research suggesting a genetic component
of manic-depression and schizophrenia).
83. Presumably, those properties of a person's character which are not fixed in advance by
his DNA structure reflect the workings of a free will whose precise operation is not causally
necessitated by any antecedent biological or physical laws. See discussion supra, Parts 11.B..,
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merely influences but does not causally pre-ordain any of the
properties that make up a person's character. Label this the
thesis of "Weak Genetic Determinism." I shall evaluate each of
these options in the next two sections.
But before we consider these three theses about the rela-
tion between genes and character, a preliminary clarification
about the general concept of genetic determinism is in order.
To say that certain properties of a person's character are
causally pre-determined by his genes is not to preclude the
causal influence of factors in the external physical environ-
ment. Some genetically ingrained traits, e.g. the symptoms of
Huntington's Disease, may be exhibited by a person regardless
of his physical environment or upbringing. But other genetical-
ly determined traits may be latent and depend for their expres-
sion upon certain causal interactions between the individual
and his external environment. For example, a person" with a
genetic disposition to alcoholism may never express this behav-
ior if he lacks any opportunity to imbibe intoxicating bever-
ages. As such, the idea that certain properties of a person's
character are causally pre-determined by his genes should be
understood to include both possibilities. If a person has a ge-
netically determined character trait, this may be because his
genes pre-determine the expression of this trait without regard
to any influences in his external environment. Alternatively, a
character trait may be genetically pre-determined if it is a
direct result of causal interactions between the person's DNA
structure and factors in his external environment. By compari-
son, if a person's character trait is not causally pre-determined
by his genes, this implies that the trait is neither pre-deter-
mined by his genetic structure alone nor that it is pre-deter-
mined by causal interactions between his genetic structure and
the external physical environment. To simplify the foregoing
exposition, I shall just describe character traits as either "caus-
ally pre-determined" or "not causally pre-determined" by DNA
structure. But the reader should keep in mind that "causally
pre-determined" means either exclusive determination by genes




in the external environment.
B. Strong Genetic Determinism
According to Strong Genetic Determinism, all aspects of
the particular character a person develops during his life histo-
ry are causally pre-determined by his DNA structure. Strong
Genetic Determinism is thus equivalent to the claim that all of
a person's mental states and mental dispositions - his past
and present thoughts, feelings, and choices, along with his vari-
ous propensities to think, feel, and choose in certain ways in
the future - are direct causal products of his DNA structure.
On this view, if God knew the scientific laws governing a
person's DNA structure and all the scientific laws governing
the remainder of the universe, He should be able to predict the
present and future course of that person's life history.' Strong
Genetic Determinism implies that a person is not really free to
think, deliberate, choose, or act differently from the ways in
which he actually does so. By contrast, our ordinary conception
of a person as an autonomous rational agent implies that per-
sons can deliberate and freely choose between two or more
alternative courses of action. To say that a person freely choos-
es one course of action over another - for example, to pursue
a legal career over a medical one - is to imply that the person
could have chosen to become a doctor instead of a lawyer even
though he did not actually do so. Strong Genetic Determinism
84. This conjecture is but a special case of the basic concept of causal determinism that has
animated classical physical theory since Newton. According to this conception, every physical
event is theoretically pre-ordained by antecedent physical laws governing a set of initial
conditions that were obtained at the birth of the universe. In modern times, this conception has
been undermined by the intrinsically probabilistic "Copenhagen interpretation" of quantum me-
chanics. As such, the deterministic assumptions of classical physics are considered highly
controversial and quite probably erroneous by a working majority of contemporary physicists. For
an accessible discussion, see PENROSE, supra note 59, at 149-301. This fact bears some
significance to the debate about free will and character that plays a central role in Part III of this
Article. Quantum mechanics does not offer any positive explanation of how free will is possible.
But it does leave some metaphysical room for the phenomenon of a free will in a world governed
by universal physical laws. See id at 296-99. This is not to say that the quantum mechanical pic-
ture is certainly conect. Indeed, some of its predictions clash with Einstein's Theory of General
Relativity and to date no one has successfully reconciled the local conflicts between these two
theories. See id. at 391-481. For present purposes, the moral is simply that the globally
deterministic assumption of classical physics ought not to be accepted uncritically or regarded as
beyond serious scientific dispute.
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denies that people really have this power of free choice. Ac-
cording to it, the actual outcomes of all a person's delibera-
tions are causally pre-ordained by interactions between his
genetic structure and the environment. We may think that we
are free to choose between a legal or medical career, and be-
tween sleeping late or getting to the office early. But according
to Strong Genetic Determinism, the phenomenal feeling of free
will we experience in everyday life must be explained away as
a peculiar albeit persistent illusion. Our genetic structure is the
dominant causal arbiter of all that we think, feel, and choose
to do.
The idea that intentional human behavior is, despite ap-
pearances, not really the product of a free will did not, of
course, originate with the birth of genetic science. Philosophers
and scientists throughout the ages have speculated that alleged-
ly free human actions might be causally pre-ordained, and
hence predictable in theory, by antecedent laws of nature.
Genetic science simply presents a hitherto undiscovered causal
mechanism as a candidate through which such universal laws
of human behavior might operate. Fifty years before the dis-
covery of DNA, the most popular candidate for such a mecha-
nism was probably Freud's dynamic account of the psyche in
terms of id, ego, and super ego. It is impossible to prove or
disprove with a priori certainty the general conjecture that all
human behavior is causally pre-ordained by any laws of nature,
let alone that it is causally pre-ordained by the laws of genet-
ics. However, from a common sense and legal perspective,
there is a compelling practical reason for retaining the idea of
free will and rejecting Strong Genetic Determinism in particu-
lar. This reason is the fact that the Strong Thesis would wreak
havoc on our ordinary conceptions of ethically responsible
agency and moral desert.85
According to our traditional concept of moral responsibili-
85. For an elucidation of this point in the more general context of the debate between
defenders of free will and advocates of causal pre-determinism, see P.F. Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-25 (1974). For discussion in a
genetics context, see Dan W. Brock, The Human Genome Project and Human Identity, in GENES
AND HUMAN SELF-KNoWLEDGE 18, 23-28 (F. Weir et. al. eds., 1994) (discussing the pros and




ty, a person is morally responsible only for those actions that
reflect the operation of a free will. Actions performed of free
will are voluntary - they reflect choices of the person that
could have been made otherwise than they were. To the extent
that a person truly could not have chosen to act in a way other
than he did, we refuse to hold him morally responsible (viz.,
blame or punish him) for the consequences of his action. 6
The idea of free and voluntary action as the wellspring of
moral responsibility is, of course, a foundational presupposition
of legal responsibility. 7 In general, an actus reus is an essen-
tial element of criminal offenses, of liability in tort, and of
valid formation of private contracts."s However, if Strong Ge-
netic Determinism were accepted, this implies that concepts of
free will and actus reus must, in fact, be empty ones. Strong
Genetic Determinism would thus nullify the deep-seated con-
ceptual foundation for our existing practices of assigning moral
praise and blame and justifying the imposition of legal sanc-
tions. But we simply have no plausible idea how to reinterpret,
revise, or justify our existing moral and legal practices on the
assumption that the familiar concepts of free will and actus
reus are empty.89 As the philosopher Immanuel Kant once
suggested in this regard, we may not be able to give a satisfy-
ing theoretical explanation of how free will is possible; but as
rational deliberating agents, we cannot act practically except
under the assumption that our wills are capable of free
choice.' So it goes for the understanding and justification of
86. For a classic discussion of the relation between free will and moral desert in a legal
context, see generally H.L.A. HART, PUNiSHMENT AND RESPONSBILrrY (1968) (drawing
"attention to the analogy between conditions that are treated by criminal law as excusing
conditions and certain similar conditions that are treated in another branch of law as invalidating
certain civil transactions").
87. See id. (stating that the law requires that "as a condition of liability to punishment, that
the person to be punished should, at the time of his offence, have had a certain knowledge of
intention or possessed certain powers of understanding and control"); Peter Arenella, Convicting
the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1524-25 (1992) (discussing the current status of legal and moral
accountability and "changes that might occur if the criminal law were to make a more honest
attempt to limit criminal liability to morally accountable actors").
88. Of course, there are exceptions to the principle that an actus reus is a predicate to legal
sanction, e.g., the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Such exceptions are rare, however, and do not
detract from the foundational status of the principle.
89. See Strawson, supra note 85.
90. Kant stated: "As a rational being.., man can never conceive the causality of his own
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our moral and legal practices - we cannot make sense of
them except under the assumption that free will is possible.
Hence, let us dismiss Strong Genetic Determinism on the
ground that we have compelling practical reason for rejecting a
theory of character and personhood which simply leaves no
space at all for the exercise of free will."
We may further observe that the claims of Strong Genetic
Determinism are particularly vulnerable to empirical refutation
by further scientific research. For example, Strong Genetic
Determinism implies that persons who share the same DNA
blueprint, that is, identical twins or genetically engineered
human clones, will behave in exactly the same ways. For ex-
ample, suppose one identical twin embarks upon a life of vio-
lent crime. Strong Genetic Determinism entails that the other
twin is doomed to engage in equally criminal pursuits provided
that both twins have the same life circumstances and upbring-
ing. Empirical studies have shown that identical twins fre-
quently exhibit remarkable similarities of character and temper-
ament.92 But empirical research has not shown, and is unlikely
to prove, that identical twins are causally pre-destined to make
exactly the same kinds of choices in life.93 As an empirical
matter, identical twins do exhibit a substantial degree of varia-
tion in the kinds of life choices they make. Of course, one
could attribute some differences in the kinds of choices made
by identical twins to different external influences in their re-
will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of determinism by causes in the
sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free. To the Idea of
freedom there is inseparably attached the concept of autonomy... A principle which in Idea
forms the ground for all actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature does for [physical
phenomena].... "IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 120 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1948).
91. Readers interested in the general topic of free will may find a useful collection of
articles in FREE WILL (Gary Watson ed., 1990). See also Bernard Williams, How Free Does the
Will Need to Be?, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PmILOSOPI-CAL PAPERS 1982-
1993, 3-21 (1995) [hereinafter How Free] (distinguishing freedom of will, "our freedom as
agents," from political or social freedom, and noting that only the latter comes in degrees); David
Wiggins, Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 269 (2nd ed. 1991)
(discussing the libertarian view of free will).
92. See Lawrence Wright, We Two Are One, GUARDIAN, Oct. 14, 1995, at 13, 16-18 (dis-
cussing some characteristics frequently shared by twins).
93. For a general review of the current state of empirical research bearing upon this issue,
see generally Charles C. Mann, Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCIENCE 1686 (1994)




spective upbringings and environments. But even if identical
twins tend to choose and deliberate in similar ways once exter-
nal influences are controlled for, it is hard to believe that each
twin lacks any freedom to choose differently from his sibling.
Proponents of Strong Genetic Determinism may stick to their
guns and postulate that any difference in choices must be ex-
plained by disparate influences of environmental factors; but
this assumption is tantamount to the claim that there is no
space at all in the world for the exercise of free will. As stated
previously, this view should be rejected as inconsistent with
our elementary concepts of moral and legal responsibility.
C. Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic Determinism
By contrast, the theory that I have called Semi-Strong
Genetic Determinism does leave some space for free will. It
holds that some properties of a person's character are fixed by
his DNA structure but other properties are not. For example, it
may be that some or all aspects of a person's intellectual and
emotional temperament are pre-ordained by his genes. Perhaps
these include his capacity for mathematical reasoning, his
disposition to altruistic behavior, or his susceptibility to depres-
sion. But other properties and dispositions of his character are
not. Let us suppose his genetic structure does not causally pre-
ordain his choice to become a mathematician instead of a law-
yer, nor his disposition to engage in criminal behavior. Instead,
these features of his character are the products of his own free
will. They are contingent artifacts of character developed
through the individual's autonomous expression of his own
unique personality. Many people would no doubt find Semi-
Strong Genetic Determinism intuitively quite plausible. Before
passing judgment upon it, let us compare it with Weak Genetic
Determinism.
Weak Genetic Determinism holds that DNA structure
influences but does not causally pre-ordain any of the proper-
ties that make up a person's character. Weak Genetic Deter-
minism does not assert that genetic structure plays no role at
all in determining a person's character. It would be foolish to
deny that a person's DNA-defined properties have a significant
causal role that influences the kinds of choices he makes and
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the character he develops throughout his life history. Rather,
Weak Genetic Determinism holds only that a person's genetic
traits do not of themselves causally pre-determine the particular
choices that a person makes or the particular character he hap-
pens to develop. As such, Weak Genetic Determinism embod-
ies a basically Kantian picture of practical reasoning and moral
agency. Kant acknowledged that human beings were prompted
to act in various ways by their biologically implanted in-
stants.94 He also held that, as rational agents blessed with the
power of free will, human beings have the capacity to choose
whether or not to act in accordance with their biologically
determined inclinations."
Consider the genetically ingrained disposition to feed
one's self. A person's genetic structure causes him to feel
hungry whenever he enters a metabolic state of malnourish-
ment. In the normal course of affairs, a person who feels hun-
gry will be disposed to eat something if presented with the
opportunity. But this is not always the case. A prisoner of
conscience may resolve to starve to death unless certain politi-
cal conditions are changed. The hunger striker will be prompt-
ed by his genetic structure to feel progressively more intense
hunger pains. But if he has the requisite strength of will, he
will not be disposed to eat anything and can refuse food even
unto death. Generalizing from this sort of case, Weak Genetic
Determinism allows that a person's genetic structure may cause
him to have certain thoughts, feelings, or emotions, and hence
"prompt" him to make certain kinds of choices or engage in
certain kinds of behavior. But a person's genetic structure
cannot of itself compel him to act on these thoughts, feelings,
or emotions. Instead, Weak Genetic Determinism holds that no
genetically prompted thought, feeling, or inclination can cause
a person to behave intentionally unless he first chooses of his
own free will to act in accordance with that prompting. In
short, Weak Genetic Determinism implies that persons have the
theoretical capacity to act against any of their genetically based
inclinations.96 Persons have the capacity to act contrary to
94. See Kant, supra note 90, at 118-31 (arguing that the concepts of freedom causal
necessity in the natural world are compatible).
95. See id.
96. In a complete account of Weak Genetic Determinism, we might want to posit a dis-
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their genetic inclinations even if, for the most part, they ac-
tually choose to conform their voluntary behavior to these
promptings.
To illustrate the difference between the Semi-Strong and
Weak Genetic determinism, consider the different analyses that
each theory might give of the fact that a poor person has cho-
sen to commit some criminal action like robbing a bank. Let us
assume that this person has a genetic trait, perhaps it is a dou-
ble "Y" chromosome, which disposes him towards aggressive,
self-seeking behavior.97 Let us further suppose this genetic
trait may cause the poor person to have certain thoughts or
feelings as a result of his financial status, just like the genetic
trait which causes him to feel hunger whenever he enters a
metabolic state of malnourishment. On Weak Genetic Deter-
minism this genetic trait may prompt the poor person with an
impulse to rob the bank, but it does not of itself causally pre-
determine his doing so in the circumstances. The person is free
to choose of his own free will whether to follow this genetic
impulse or not, and may be held morally and legally account-
able for failing to resist it. By contrast, Semi-Strong Genetic
Determinism leaves open the possibility that the poor person
may have acted intentionally without having acted freely. It
tinction between two levels of control that a person could have over his genetic inclinations. In the
first category, we might have genetic inclinations like hunger that can be completely overridden
by a person's conscious exercise of will. In the second category, we might have genetic inclina-
tions to actions which can sometimes, but perhaps not always, be overridden by an exercise of
will, e.g., a person's genetic inclination to breathe or to flinch at an object moving rapidly towards
him. Perhaps some people have the strength of will to hold their breath until they lose con-
sciousness, or to refrain from flinching at a hammer blow no matter how certain the probability of
harmful impact. However, it is not clear that a person has a standing ability to ignore the genetic
inclination to breath or to flinch in the presence of harmful blows. Therefore, we might want to
distinguish between types of genetic inclinations that are subject to total or to partial control by a
person's free will. At the same time, this distinction should not play any substantial role in the
account of the relation between genes and character developed in this paper. See discussion supra,
Part IU.D. I shall argue that regardless of whether we accept Weak or Semi-Strong Genetic
Determinism, the essential ingredients of a person's character are constituted only by behavior
that is subject to complete control by the person's free will.
97. The genotypes of most human males carry a single "Y" chromosome, but some contain
two occurrences of this chromosome. Some empirical evidence suggests that the minority of
males who have the double "Y" chromosome are at statistically greater risk of engaging in violent
criminal behavior. See P. B. Whatmore, Behaviour Disorders and Pattern of Crime Among XYY
Males Identified at a Maximum Security Hospital, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 533 (1967). For a discussion of
this data in a legal context, see Kenneth J. Burke, The 'XYY Syndrome': Genetics, Behavior and
the Law, 46 DENY. L. J. 261,263-64 (1969).
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may not have been possible for him to resist the genetic im-
pulse to rob the bank because his genetic structure causally
pre-ordains such intentionally criminal behavior in the circum-
stances. If the person were truly not free to act differently, then
(in theory) he should not be held morally and legally responsi-
ble for his actions.
What then, is the most plausible theory of the relation
between character and genetic structure? The Semi-Strong
Genetic Determinism that holds some, but not all, properties of
a person's character are causally pre-determined by his genes?
Or the Weak Genetic Determinism that holds that DNA struc-
ture merely influences but does not causally pre-ordain any of
the properties that define a person's character? Significantly,
we do not have to decide this question to elucidate the most
important features of the relation between character and genetic
structure. As far as a person's character is concerned, the dif-
ference between Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic Determinism
is not a difference in kind, but merely one of degree. Given
that we may rightly insist upon retaining some space of free
action for the exercise of one's autonomous will, the distinc-
tion between Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic Determinism
simply reflects two different drawings of the boundaries of this
space. Weak Genetic Determinism asserts that the space of free
action coincides with the space of intentional human behavior,
that all free actions are intentionally chosen (and vice-versa).
By contrast, Semi-Strong Genetic Determinism asserts that the
space of free action is more restricted than the space of inten-
tional behavior. It claims that all free actions are intentionally
chosen, but some intentional choices - those causally pre-
determined by a person's genetic structure - may not corre-
spond to free actions. Acceptance of either the Semi-Strong or
Weak Genetic Determinism does have significantly different
practical consequences for the application of our ordinary con-
cepts of moral and legal responsibility. But a choice between
them does not change the fundamental picture of the relation
between character and genetic structure. Hence, for our purpos-
es, we may remain justifiably indifferent to the choice between
them. The reason for this indifference is that, to us, the most
important ingredients of a person's character will be the fea-




Before elaborating why this is so in the next section, I
want to note in passing that one might plausibly extrapolate
within our legal system an implicit agnosticism and/or ambiva-
lence over the choice between Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic
Determinism. (We have already seen that Strong Genetic De-
terminism conflicts with fundamental precepts about free will
and moral responsibility presupposed by actual legal practice.)
To illustrate, consider the legal defense of insanity for
criminal offenses. It is not implausible that many, perhaps even
all, legally excusing mental illnesses are caused in whole or in
part by defective genetic traits. Hence it is instructive to exam-
ine the insanity defense with this pathological correspondence
in mind. Perhaps half of the states currently employ a two-
pronged standard for the insanity defense.9" The first prong is
a cognitive test. It excuses a criminal defendant from legal re-
sponsibility if, due to mental illness, he either did not know the
nature of the act he committed or that an act of this nature was
wrong. The second prong is a volitional test. It excuses the
defendant if, due to mental illness, he was subject to an "un-
controllable" impulse that caused him to act wrongfully not-
withstanding specific knowledge that the act was wrongful. In
the present context, the cognitive test mirrors the standard of
Weak Genetic Determinism. It implicitly charges a defendant
with legal responsibility for all his intentional actions. But the
cognitive test will carve out an excuse where the defendant
intentionally commits an act that is wrongful but, due to men-
tal illness of genetic origin, does not intentionally commit an
act he believes to be wrongful. By comparison, the volitional
test is consistent with the standard of Semi-Strong Genetic
Determinism. The volitional test will absolve a defendant of
responsibility for intentional and knowingly wrongful action if,
due to mental illness of genetic origin, the defendant was inca-
pable (or substantially incapable) of refraining from such action
at that time.
98. For a complete list of state and federal rules current as of 1980, see Robert J. Favole,
Mental Disability in the American Criminal Process: A Four Issue Survey, in 6 MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAw AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 247, 257-69 (John
Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1983).
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It is not appropriate to review the evolution of insanity
defense jurisprudence at any length here. But roughly speaking,
the insanity defense first appeared in Anglo-American common
law as a cognitive test. 9 Progressive dissatisfaction with an
exclusively cognitive standard, undoubtedly influenced by the
advent of modem psychiatric theory, led to widespread incor-
poration of an independent volitional prong."° In recent
times, the volitional prong has fallen out of favor with legal
commentators and the lay population. In response, the federal
government and a number of states have repudiated the voli-
tional prong and retreated back to an exclusively cognitive
standard.'' Arguably, this history testifies implicitly to ag-
nosticism and ambivalence within the legal system about the
choice between Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic Determinism.
D. The Essential Relation Between Genes and Character
Let us return to confront the question about the need to
choose between Semi-Strong and Weak Genetic Determinism.
Previously I asserted that we may remain justifiably agnostic
about this choice - at least as far as our picture of the funda-
mental relation between genetic traits and a person's character
99. The seminal case here is M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) (holding that a
criminal defendant may be found not guilty by reason of insanity if he either did not know the
nature and quality of his act or that the act in question was wrong).
100. An early and influential decision embracing the volitional test is Parsons v. State, 2 So.
854, 859 (Ala. 1887) (holding that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, due to mental
disease, he had lost the power of free will to choose between right and wrong at the time the crim-
inal act was committed). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962) (stating
that a defendant may be acquitted by reason of insanity if he lacked either the substantial capacity
to "appreciate the criminality" of his conduct or to "conform his conduct to the requirements of
law").
101. Popular dissatisfaction with the volitional prong came to a head in the aftermath of
John Hinckley's insanity acquittal for the attempted assassination of President Reagan. Partially in
response to the public outcry, Congress passed a new federal insanity statute, The Insanity
Defense Act of 1981, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), all but eliminated the volitional element in federal
law in favor of reliance on an exhaustively cognitive standard. See generally PHILLIP JOHNSON,
CRIMINAL LAw, CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXr 319 (4th ed. 1990). See also U.S. v. Lyons, 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984) (holding "that a person is not
responsible for criminal conduct on the grounds of insanity only if at the time of that conduct, as a
result of a mental disease or defect, he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct").
In the state arena, California adopted the two-pronged standard from the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. See People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1326 (Cal. 1978). But in 1982, California
voters approved a new statute that eliminated the volitional prong and imposed a strict and
exclusively cognitive test. See JOHNSON, supra, at 344-45.
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is concerned. To explain why this is so, let us set aside the
idea of a person's genetically determined mental traits and just
consider the relation between a person's character and his
DNA-defined physical traits.
A person's physical traits obviously contribute in impor-
tant ways towards the determination of his character. For ex-
ample, the kinds of choices that a person confronts and makes
during his life history are clearly shaped by his height, looks,
body morphology, susceptibility to medical diseases, and so on.
A person's physical attributes may confine or extend the space
of choices available to the free exercise of his will. If someone
is born with the body structure of an NFL linebacker, he may
have the ability to choose whether or not to bench-press a 500
pound weight. But for the rest of us, this is not an option no
matter how intense our exercise regime. Similarly, if someone
is blessed with extremely agile fingers and perfect pitch, she
may have the ability to choose whether to become a world
class violinist. But less gifted people do not have the luxury of
this career choice. A person's physical traits contribute to the
determination of his character insofar as they set upper and
lower boundaries on what he can or cannot successfully choose
to accomplish or do. But these physical traits do not causally
pre-determine the particular character that the person will de-
velop. Instead, a person's physical traits simply define a space
of background possibilities within which he is free to develop a
unique character through the operation of his autonomous will.
A person's physical traits are, so to speak, the raw material out
of which his character is created, but they are not to be identi-
fied with the finished product.
Now let us consider the relation of a person's character to
his genetically defined mental traits (whatever they may be). If
a person's genetic traits pre-determine some features of his
intentional behavior, then, like his physical traits, they set
upper and lower boundaries on what he can or cannot success-
fully choose to do. A person with an inexorable genetic dispo-
sition towards altruistic behavior may be incapable of inten-
tionally choosing to act in immoral ways. Conversely, a person
with an immutable genetic disposition to aggressive self-seek-
ing behavior may be incapable of conforming his behavior to
moral strictures. Should we say that it is part of the character
216 [Vol. 8:179
DNA BLUEPRINTS
of the first person to choose like a saint and the second to
choose like a sinner? In one sense, yes. But in a deeper sense,
the answer should be no. Our concept of a person's character
is that of a rational agent blessed with the power of free will.
Moreover, a person's character is necessarily an object of
ethical evaluation, the bearer of moral praise and blame."°
Consequently, a person's character is distinguished in its essen-
tials as the artifact of morally appraisable choices expressed
through his autonomous will. By contrast, the kind of character
that we ascribe to non-rational animals is not a fitting object of
moral appraisal. Non-rational animals have no free will; they
have no alternative but to conform with the promptings of their
genetically implanted instincts." Thus, we do not subject
them to moral praise or blame, and we may rightly insist on a
difference in essence between person and animal characters.
What then, are we to say about the characters of the ge-
netically determined saint or sinner? Should we count the
saint's genetically pre-determined beneficence, or the sinner's
iniquity, as part of their essentially human characters? I suggest
not. If a person is genetically programmed to be incapable of
anything but altruistic behavior, we should not laud this behav-
ior as a morally admirable feature of his character. The altruis-
tic aspects of the person's conduct may be useful or pleasing to
102. The idea that a person's character is an intrinsic object of moral assessment has ancient
roots dating back at least to the time of Aristotle. For philosophical discussions of free will and
personhood, see generally Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,
68 J. PIL. 5 (1971); Irwin, supra note 46, at 139-42 (discussing whether a person's character is
the product of his environment and the amount of responsibility that can be attached to his
actions); Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205 (1975) (comparing and contrasting the views
of Plato and Frankfurt regarding whether the concept of free will exists); Williams, How Free, su-
pra note 91, at 27-32 (discussing character and responsibility for actions).
103. A few caveats are necessary here. First, it is true by definition that non-rational animals
lack free will. But it is also possible that some animals, e.g., dolphins and the higher primates,
possess rudimentary reasoning abilities. Certain non-human animals may one day demonstrate de-
liberative reasoning capacities approximating those of human beings. If so, we may justly attribute
some measure of free will to these animals and perhaps even treat them as subjects of moral
assessment. The second caveat is that even if non-rational animals lack free will, this is not to im-
ply that their genetically ingrained behavior is incapable of modification through training. For
example, rats might be trained to ignore food that is surrounded by an electrified grill. However,
such training does not cause a non-rational animal to choose freely against its genetic inclinations.
It simply causes the rat to act on one kind of genetically ingrained inclination over another. In
sum, we can modify the behavior of non-rational animals by altering the character of the physical
environment in which they are embedded. This observation is entriely consistent with the idea that
non-rational animal behavior is causally pre-determined by interactions between its genetic
structure and its external environment.
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us, but they do not warrant moral esteem anymore than, say,
the genetically selected docility of a dairy cow. Conversely, if
a person is genetically programmed to emit self-serving and
violent behavior, we cannot justifiably deplore this as a moral-
ly reprehensible aspect of his character. We may incarcerate
such a dangerous individual to safeguard the common weal.
But we cannot regard this aspect of his behavior as the bearer
of moral blame - anymore than we can the conduct of a tiger
or a great white shark. More generally, if a person's genetic
structure determines that some instances of his intentional
behavior are not the product of his own free will, then to that
extent this genetically compelled behavior is not an ingredient
of the morally assessable, essentially human character that is
him. If a person has genetically determined mental traits, these
traits should bear the same kind of relation to his essentially
human character as his genetically determined physical traits.
That is, genetically determined mental traits would merely
function - like physical traits of genetic origin - as parame-
ters that fix a space of background possibilities within which a
human being is free to develop a unique character through
exercise of his own autonomous will. In sum, a person's genet-
ically defined traits - be they physical or mental in nature -
are nothing but the raw materials out of which his character is
created. They ought not to be confused with the finished prod-
uct.
Let us take stock of the discussion so far. We have seen
that DNA structure is not a logically sufficient condition for
personal identity, because two or more persons can share the
same genetic blueprint. The logically necessary and sufficient
condition for personal identity is sameness of biological kind
(viz. human) and sameness of spatiotemporal position or route.
We have also evaluated the psychologically important concept
of character as an alternative but logically coincident criterion
of personal identity. We saw that a person's character is distin-
guished from the kinds of character we ascribe to non-rational
animals in being a fitting object of moral appraisal. Since
moral praise or blame can only accrue to behavior that is the
product of a person's free will, the essence of a person's char-
acter is created by the autonomous choices he confronts and
makes over the course of his life history. It follows that a
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person's genetically ingrained traits, be they physical or men-
tal, are not to be regarded as essential determinants of his
character. A person's genetic traits are merely a set of parame-
ters that fix a background space of possibilities within which
the person is free to create a unique character by exercise of
his own free will.
What then may we conclude by way of final analysis
about the relation between an individual's DNA structure and
his personal identity? First, DNA structure can, of course, be
regarded as a necessary condition for personal identity. No two
individuals A and B can be the same person unless they have
the same DNA blueprint. However, DNA structure should not
be conflated with the "essential encoder" of an immutable
personal identity or character. Qua character, the essence of a
person's identity is encoded in the contingent, genetically non-
predetermined facts about what a person freely chooses to do
with his life while wending his way through the spatiotemporal
world.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not my purpose here to offer detailed suggestions as
to how courts and legislatures should imbue an individual's
right to genetic privacy with positive content. Rather, my aim
is largely negative in character. It is to debunk the widely in-
fluential idea that DNA constitutes the "Holy Grail" of person-
al identity and, by implication, that DNA information merits
exceptional legal protection under the right to privacy for that
reason. The impending completion of the Human Genome Ini-
tiative, not to mention the startling news that genetic scientists
have recently amassed technical "know-how" sufficient for the
cloning of entire human beings, is liable to prompt increasingly
strident calls to treat DNA with factually irrational reverence as
the "essential encoder" of human personality. These calls
should be properly resisted. Recent and impending advances in
genetic science do not warrant any transformation of our con-
cept of personal identity or character into essentially genetic
terms. Genetic traits, be they mental or physical in nature, are
simply the raw material from which an individual creates a
unique character through the operation of his own autonomous
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will. Consequently, legislatures and courts should resist pres-
sure to give DNA information special legal protection that
derives from the misguided idea that DNA constitutes the
sacred essence of an individual's personal identity.
This is not of course to imply that an individual has no
legally protected privacy interest in his own genetic informa-
tion. We should still acknowledge that genetic information
deserves substantial legal protection for much the same reasons
as ordinary medical information. An individual's DNA blue-
print contains a great deal of information that has, or will be
discovered to have, substantial medical applications for the
diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of disease. If genetic in-
formation has actual or foreseeable medical consequences, it
should trigger the kinds of legal safeguards traditionally ap-
plied to protect the privacy of more mundane varieties of medi-
cally significant information."°4 To extract medical informa-
tion, health care practitioners must inform patients of the sig-
nificance of this data and the nature of the procedures used to
acquire it. The patient, so informed, must then voluntarily
consent to the extraction of this information from his person.
Once acquired, the disclosure of this medical information to
third parties is subject to the principle of doctor-patient confi-
dentiality. In general, this principle entails that information
contained in an individual's medical records is made available
only to recipients that are authorized with a legal right of ac-
cess, and then only on a "need-to-know" basis."°5 The extrac-
tion or use of genetic information for both medical and non-
medical purposes should be subject to a similar set of legal
constraints.
DNA information may of course be distinguished from
ordinary medical information in regard to the relative strength
104. On the legal rules that govern the acquisition and use of medical information, see
generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE To PATIENT
RIGHTS 160-95 (2nd ed. 1989). For a proposed model of legal rules protecting the privacy of DNA
data that draws on principles governing the acquisition and use of medical information, see
Annas, supra note 8, at 2348-49. See generally John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics,
Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L. J. 747 (1990)
(discussing ethical issues and proposing social policies); Janet A. Kobrin, Confidentialit) of
Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1283 (1983) (discussing genetic screening techniques and
proposing legislative guidelines to regulate disclosure of genetic information).
105. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 8, at 2348.
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and scope of scientific predictions that can be predicated upon
it. For example, we can make more comprehensive predictions
from the observation that an individual has the gene for Sickle
cell disease than we can from the observation that he has ab-
normally low hemoglobin levels in his blood. At the same
time, we should keep in mind the fact that the distinction be-
tween genetic information and ordinary medical information
about a person's body is a difference of degree, not of kind.
The perhaps unprecedented predictive strength of genetic in-
formation should not be mistaken for the hallowed ground of
personal identity itself. DNA information should no more be
conflated with the "sacred vessel" of an individual's inviolate
personality than should ordinary medical information about his
blood type or white cell count. In their endeavors to fashion
new legal safeguards, legislatures and courts should not suc-
cumb to the influence of the popular, but ultimately irrational,
idea that DNA is the essence of human personality.
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